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THIS BITTER HAS SOME SWEET: POTENTIAL
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT BENEFITS FROM
PATENT LAW'S PROCEDURAL RULES
JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER*

Antitrust lawyers know that at least some patent licenses warrant scrutiny to assess what appear to be anticompetitive effects. The steeply rising
rate at which the Patent & Trademark Office issues patentsI in all sectors
of the economy, including pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and computer technology, makes the necessity for such antitrust scrutiny all
the more pressing. Antitrust lawyers also worry, however, that antitrust
enforcement in the patent licensing area presents special difficultiesspecial, because the difficulties appear rooted in a less familiar body of
law (patent law) that accepts as routine the very agreements that antitrust
enforcement agency lawyers want to scrutinize.
The burdens of this essay are three. First, I squarely confirm the
core antitrust agency fear about scrutinizing patent license agreements.
Antitrust cases about patent licenses do turn, at bottom, on the answer
to the primary patent law question whether the patentee has a valid right
to foreclose some particular conduct of another. Second, I suggest that,
notwithstanding the central role of substantive patent law to the antitrust
analysis, things are not as dire as they may seem. As it turns out, some
patent law rules can benefit the antitrust enforcement agencies by aiding
their scrutiny of patent license agreements. These benefits may, however,
be rather paltry when set against the overall enforcement challenge the
agencies face under current law. We need, in my view, to take much
* Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. I first prepared this piece as written
testimony for the May 14, 2002, session of the joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, conducted by the Federal
Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. It was
an honor to participate in the Joint Hearings, and I thank the participants in the May 14
session for their encouragement.
I See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REzv. 1495,
1497-1500 (2001) (detailing 51% increase in number of utility patents issued annually,
and 42% increase in number of utility patent applications filed annually, from 1994 to
1999). Even if the issue rate for U.S. utility patents stabilizes at its 2001 level of about
166,000 per year, that still amounts to about 454 utility patents issued per day.
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larger strides toward renewing balanced roles for intellectual property
law and antitrust law in structuring competition. Thus, third, I encourage
the antitrust enforcement agencies to take a far more active role in
articulating and urging the adoption of antitrust-spirited reforms to
patent law. After all, "the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is 'to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts."' 2 It is troubling, then, that
the agencies' valuable perspectives and experiences have so long been
missing from contemporary policy debates about patent law reform, to
the detriment of the competition law framework of which patent law is
but one part.
I. WHY PATENT LICENSE SCRUTINY TURNS ON
PATENT LAW RULES
Many patent licenses are, from the antitrust law perspective, entirely
wholesome. Perhaps, for example, the license merely clears the way for
two firms to compete in the market for a product by giving each one access
to the other's complementary patented input. 3 Other patent licenses, by
contrast, plainly retard competition in a product or technology market
without enhancing efficiency at all. Perhaps, for example, the license
places one firm in control over the exploitation of two substitute technol2 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8). See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather,
the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It
is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)
("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered."). The very same point has often been made
about patent law's companion regime, copyright law. See, e.g.,
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8)); Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is
to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property § 5.5 (1995) [hereinafter IP Guidelines] ("Cross-licensing ...may provide procompetitive benefits by integratingcomplementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blockingpositions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation."
(emphasis added)).
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ogies that had previously been independent-leading ultimately to
higher product prices.'
When the antitrust enforcement authorities confront license agreements that are clearly pro- or anticompetitive, they can readily classify
the licenses and respond accordingly. As we can all attest, life far more
often presents us with facts in the mushy middle. The patents at issue
may cover technologies that are substitutes in some respects but complements in others,5 or the parties' agreement may contain a "grant-back"
clause that makes the balance of pro- and anticompetitive effects far
more difficult to assess with confidence, or ... and so on.
Let us focus here on but one scenario from the mushy middle. Consider
the situation where an enforcement agency has some independent basis
to believe the license agreement warrants scrutiny and the scope of the
patent right at issue is unclear to a significant degree.6 The character of
the parties' relationship absent the license under review-is it primarily
horizontal, primarily vertical, or a hybrid?-is thus also unclear to a
significant degree. How does one resolve this ambiguity about the scope
of the underlying patent right and, in turn, the parties' respective competitive positions?
The question whether the parties' relationship absent the license is
horizontal, vertical, or both is, of course, more than sport. The agencies'
joint IP Guidelines make the answer to this question a fundamental step
in the antitrust inquiry:
As with other property transfers, antitrust analysis of intellectual property licensing arrangements examines whether the relationship among
the parties to the arrangement is primarily horizontal or vertical in
nature, or whether it has substantial aspects of both....
...For analytical purposes, the Agencies ordinarily will treat a relationship between a licensor and its licensees, or between licensees,

4See id. § 5.1 & Example 9; see also Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust, Patent Pools, and the
Management of Uncertainty, 3 ArLANTIC L.J. 1, 22-24 (2000) (describing FTC's enforcement
action against the Summit/VISX patent pool for photorefractive keratectomy technology).
5Professor Newberg suggests this may have been the case in the Summit/VISX matter.
See Newberg, supra note 4, at 24 ("Based on the uncertain claims of the pooled patents
and the designs of the similar Summit and VISX machines, there may well have been a
nontrivial basis for Summit to believe that it could have been blocked by one or more of
VISX's patents and vice versa.").
61 put to one side license provisions that may raise antitrust concerns even where it is
certain that, absent the license, the licensee's conduct would infringe a valid patent owned
by the licensor. See IP Guidelines, supra note 3, §§ 5.2 (resale price maintenance), 5.3
(tying), 5.4 (exclusive dealing).
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as horizontal when they would have been actual or likely potential
7
competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license.

Similarly, every one of the Antitrust Division's four recent "business
review letters" regarding proposed patent pools explains that its favorable
evaluation turns, at least in part, on the continuing use of an independent
patent expert to determine whether the patents in the pool actually cover
essential, complementary technologies-a matter of applying substantive
patent law analysis.8 In short, although one can defer for a time ajudgment about precisely how the patent(s) at issue in an agreement would
structure competition between the parties absent the agreement, any
useful antitrust analysis must eventually bring this matter to ground.9
How, then, to do so? How can the ambiguity about the scope of the
critical patent rights be resolved?
The enforcement agencies' recentJoint Hearings on a variety of questions at the cross-roads of intellectual property and antitrust law 0 reveal
an interesting perspective on this point. For example, the FTC press
release for the Joint Hearings session at which I appeared framed the
afternoon's discussion like this: "what standards should be used to determine whether the licensed intellectual property right would have fore7 Id. § 3.3; see also id. Examples 5 & 6 (comparing horizontal and vertical relationships
among hypothetical farm equipment makers who also own patents on disparate technologies).
I Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) ("The continuing
role of an independent expert to assess essentiality is an especially effective guarantor
that the Portfolio patents are complements, not substitutes."), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/busreview/1170.htm; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998)
("[S]o long as the patent expert applies this [essentiality) criterion scrupulously and
independently, it is reasonable to expect that the Portfolio will combine complementary
patent rights while not limiting competition between them and other patent rights for
purposes of the licensed applications."), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/
2121.htm; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Carey R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison at 10 (June 10,
1999) (same), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm;
Letter from
Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Ky P.
Ewing, Vinson & Elkins at 10 (Nov. 12, 2002) ("The arrangements proposed in connection
with the Platform, including.., the provisions for review of [patent] essentiality by competent experts without conflicts of interest and payment of the costs of evaluation through
fees assessed on applicants ... provide reasonable assurance that patents combined in a
single PlatformCo for a 3G radio interface technology will not be substitutes for one
another."), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.htm.
9 By"useful," I simply mean "able to support either the confident closing of an investigation or the filing of an antitrust enforcement action."
10The Federal Trade Commission's Web site contains a wealth of information about
the Joint Hearings. Seegenerally http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm (gateway page
to Joint Hearings materials).
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closed the licensee from being an actual or likely potential competitor
with the licensor in the absence of the license?" 1 To pose the question
this way is to suggest (to my ear, at least) that one hopes the answer will
be something other than the perfectly obvious one-namely, the patent
law rules that determine the scope of the patents in question. Such hopes,
however, are vain. Economic theory honed by experience continues to
teach us which outward signs indicate that a particular license agreement
warrants intense antitrust scrutiny, 2 but only patent law rules can finally
tell us whether, e.g., a licensor's patent could truly have been used to
oust a licensee from the market for that particular product or process
(indicating a genuinely vertical relationship).
I know that this answer-that patent law standards are central to
assessing the asserted foreclosure of the licensee absent the licensemay dishearten some who soldier in the trenches of antitrust enforcement. The knowledge comes from having soldiered in those trenches
myself, however briefly.' The feared scenario runs something like this:
Parties under investigation, knowing that the agency is not filled with
seasoned patent litigators or patent prosecutors, try to shield a suspicious
license agreement beneath a thicket of interrelated patents (each of
which is dauntingly complex on its own), fairly daring the enforcement
agency to embark on a substantive assessment of the true scope of those
patent rights. The proponents of the license agreement argue that the
agency must be prepared, if it files a challenge to the agreement, to
prove as part of its case in chief either that the patents are invalid or
that the licensee had commercially viable ways to enter the market
without infringing the patents. The parties' favored cudgel here is the
" Federal Trade Commission Press Release, FTC/DOJ Hearings to Highlight the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law (Apr. 10, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2002/04/iplaw2.htm.
12 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate § III.A (Apr. 23, 2002) (listing types
of license provisions between name and generic drug makers that "have drawn antitrust
scrutiny"), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm; John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851
(2002) (exploring economic model for assessing competitive effects of concentrated patent
holdings in oligopoly markets); The Evolution of Guidelines: DOJ/FTC Hearings on
Competition and Intellectual Property Law in the Knowledge-Based Economy 11-20 (Feb.
6, 2002) (presentation of Richard Gilbert, Prof. of Econ., Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley)
(suggesting criteria to identify license agreements warranting devotion of enforcement
resources), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/guidel.pdf; Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits
to Patent Settlements 9 (May 1, 2001) ("A hallmark of these anti-competitive [patent
license] agreements is that the patent holder agrees to share its monopoly profits with
the challenger in order to induce the challenger to give up its fight."), http://www.ftc.gov/
opp/intellect/020502shapiro.pdf.
3I was privileged to serve as a trial attorney in the Antitrust Division for about one
year, 2000-2001.
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statutory presumption of validity that patents enjoy in routine infringement litigation. 14 The agency takes the bait, and the investigation grinds
to an inconclusive halt under the weight of the substantive analysis of
patent scope. Although the license agreement justifiably arouses suspicion of harm to competition, the agency fails to reach a solid conclusion
on the merits, much less challenge the agreement in court.
But there is less cause for despair here than may at first appear. The
key is realizing that patent law contains not only substantive doctrines
that define the scope of a patent owner's power to exclude others, but
also critical procedural rules that go a long way toward determining the
patentee's practical ability to foreclose competitors in the real world. 15
For example, patent law puts the burden on the patentee to make a
strong showing of the patent's validity before forcing the peremptory
removal of a competitor from the market with a preliminary injunction.
I discuss some consequences of this patentee burden for antitrust analysis
of challenged patent license practices. I also describe another patent
law procedural device-the drawing of an adverse inference when an
accused infringer refuses to divulge the content of its counsel's opinion
about the scope of an asserted patent-that appears to offer help when
judging license proponents' arguments about patent scope. In short,
although the burden of applying patent law's substantive rules may at
first taste bitter, the antitrust enforcement benefits from patent law's
procedural rules may prove quite sweet.
II. PATENT LICENSES AS PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
AND FAILING-FIRM EXITS
Assume we are scrutinizing a patent license with one patentee and
one licensee concerning one patent. We evaluate the agreement for
antitrust purposes by comparing its effects on competition to the results
14See 35 U.S.C. § 282 ("A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether
in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be
presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.").
15Professor Shapiro, in his provocative paper exploring the merits of a "simple antitrust
rule" that "a patent settlement cannot lead to lower expected consumer surplus than
would have arisen from ongoing litigation," supra note 12, at 10, poses questions that
highlight the central role that procedural rules play in defining patent value:
A number of different rules can materially affect the value of the patent grant.
Under what conditions can a patent holder obtain a preliminary injunction
blocking another firm from producing products that allegedly infringe the patent?
How long does patent litigation take, and what is the state of competition during
the interim period while patent validity and infringement are being resolved
in court?
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
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that would obtain in various "but-for" worlds. The most salient "but-for"
world is the one that would exist if the parties had continued with their
prior courses of conduct but without the license.
The clearest case for antitrust concern is one in which the license
transforms a competitive relationship into a coordinated one. Perhaps
the parties were actually competing in a product or service market, or
in a market for licenses to their respective technologies. Perhaps they
were not yet competing on present sales, but the second party was taking
concrete steps-incurring real costs-to enter the market in the near
term. As a factual matter, they were competitors.16 This state of prelicense, de facto competition, at least in instances where the rival-turnedlicensee knew of the patent's arguable applicability and had been competing anyway, is strong evidence that the rival viewed the risk of patent
infringement liabillity as more than offset by the gains to be had in the
17
market in question.
Now take the license option out of the equation. Competition continues. In this "but-for" world without the license agreement, the patentee
may yet wish to eliminate its rival as an independent actor in the market.
Taking the unavailability of the license agreement as given, we know
that the patentee has only two options that rely on enforcement of the
patent right. The patentee can sue on the patent and oust its competitor
either (1) temporarily, by successfully moving for a preliminary injunction that bars the competitor's activity until the suit is fully resolved; or
(2) permanently, by securing a permanent injunction after a favorable
full trial on the merits of all disputed infringement and validity issues
18
(including through any appeal).
It is worth pausing for a moment to clarify precisely what such a patent
suit entails for the patentee. The suit must assert one or more specific
patents against particular conduct. A patent, which includes a more or
less lengthy written description that sets forth the protected invention
in its technological context, ends with a series of numbered paragraphs
called "claims." Each of these numbered paragraphs marks out the
16See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§§ 1.3 & 3 (rev. 1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]; IP Guidelines, supra note 3, § 3.3.
17 Even stronger evidence on the point would be the rival's decision to indemnify other
parties against patent infringement liability claims made by this patentee on this patent.
Depending upon the technology, such indemnification may be needed to induce customers
to deal with the rival rather than with the patentee.
1SA temporary foreclosure of competition may, of course, become permanent if a
successful preliminary injunction motion is followed by the patentee's victory in the full
trial on the merits.
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periphery of a territory from which the patentee can exclude others.' 9
Indeed, this power to exclude is the essence of the patent right.20 For
example, U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036, entitled "Method of Exercising a
Cat"-which I use as a teaching tool in my Intellectual Property Law
Survey course-contains the following independent claim:
1. A method of inducing aerobic exercise in an unrestrained cat
comprising the steps of:
(a) directing an intense coherent beam of invisible light produced
by a hand-held laser apparatus to produce a bright highlyfocused pattern of light at the intersection of the beam and
an opaque surface, said pattern being of visual interest to a
cat; and
(b) selectively redirecting said beam out of the cat's immediate
reach to induce said cat to run and chase said beam and pattern
of light around an exercise area.2
One does not infringe this patent claim unless one engages in both steps
in all their detail. The patent claim provides the patentee with a cause
of action against persons practicing this method without the patentee's permission.
Importantly, it is not up to the accused infringer to prove that its
activity falls outside the patentee's control. Rather, at trial, the patentee
bears the burden of proving that such infringement has in fact occurred:
"To establish infringement, every limitation set forth in a patent claim
must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial
equivalent. The patentee bears the burden of proving infringement by
a preponderance of the evidence." 2 2 In short, firms are generally free
to compete in a market unless the patentee can prove its specific right
23
to exclude that particular conduct in court.
19See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.").
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this tide, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor, infringes the patent."). See also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
539, 549 (1852) ("The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right
to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the
permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent.").
21U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (issued Aug. 22, 1995).
22 Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
Citations for the point are legion.
2-The patentee's fundamental and unshifting burden to prove infringement, a longsettled feature of patent law, has proved troublesome for at least some antitrust enforce-
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When we compare the actual, patent license-containing world (lacking
any trial where the patentee is put to its proof) with a "but-for," licensefree world (where the patentee has no power to exclude a competitor
unless it can carry its burden of proving infringement before a neutral
and independent adjudicator), at least two things relevant to our inquiry
become apparent. First, by eliminating its competitor as an independent
actor in the market without going to the trouble of successfully prosecuting a
full trial on the merits in which it has proved to a neutral and independent
authority that the competitor has actually infringed the patent, the patentee who licenses its competitor obtains the functional equivalent of a
preliminary injunction barring the competitor's conduct. The competitor is brought under the patentee's control without a trial, and on terms
agreeable to the patentee.
Second, to the extent that the parties defend the license from antitrust
scrutiny by maintaining that it has not foreclosed any lawful competition,
they rely on a patent-based "failing firm" defense. "There has been
no harm to competition," the license proponents argue, "because the
patentee's valid and infringed patent would sooner or later have forced
the competitor to exit the market anyway." This defense of the license
maps readily onto the failing firm defense to a merger, according to
which, "[w] here the likely alternative to a merger is the elimination of
the firm and its assets from the market, the merger will not violate" the
24
antitrust laws.
The central project here is to consider how best to determine whether
the patent at the center of the agreement we are scrutinizing would
have foreclosed the licensee from being an actual or likely competitor
of the licensor in the absence of the license. The foregoing aspects of
the license agreement-that it is functionally a preliminary injunction
against the licensee, and that it assumes the truth of a failing firm
theory-suggest two corresponding principles that the antitrust agencies
ment decision makers. In the initial decision in the Federal Trade Commission's K-Dur
license case, Administrative Law Judge Chappell turned this patent law axiom on its
head, holding that the generic drug makers had to prove noninfringement of ScheringPlough's patent:
Under its '743 patent, Schering had the legal right to exclude Upsher-Smith
from the market until Upsher-Smith either proved that the '743 patent was invalid
or that its product, Klor Con M20, did not infringe Schering's patent. Similarly,
Schering had the legal right tinder its '743 patent to exclude ESI from the market
until ESI either proved that the '743 patent was invalid, or that its product, MicroK20, did not infringe Schering's patent.
Schering-Plough Corp., FTC Docket No. 9297, slip op. at 104 (June 27, 2002) (initial
decision) (public record version), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/d9297.htm.
24 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANIr]UsT LAW DEVEI1OPMENTS 337 (4th ed.

1997) [hereinafter

DEVELOPMENTS].
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should use to shape their investigations of patent licenses, as well as any
resulting court challenge to a patent license. First, a patentee should be
no better off when defending the presumptive scope of its licensed
patent rights to an antitrust agency than it would be if it were attempting
to obtain a preliminary injunction against the competitor. Second, an
antitrust agency should be no worse off when assessing the erstwhile
competitor's good faith basis for sacrificing its independence to the
patentee than it would be if it were challenging a merger that the parties
defend on failing firm grounds. I consider the practical payoff of each
principle in turn.
A.

WHEN PROVING VALIDITY

Is

THE PATENTEE'S BURDEN

My first suggested principle is that a patentee should be no better off
when defending the presumptive scope of its licensed patent rights to
an antitrust agency than it would be if it were attempting to obtain a
preliminary injunction against the competitor. What does this mean
in practice?
The proponents of a dubious patent license agreement may urge that,
because the patent enjoys a statutory presumption of validity under
35 U.S.C. § 282, the agency cannot challenge a license agreement as
anticompetitive without proving by clear and convincing evidence that
the patent is invalid.25 By doing so, the license proponents ignore the
question of infringement altogether. A patentee has no right to exclude
from the market persons who are not infringing, i.e., not practicing the
claimed invention in all its detail. As a result, a patent cannot justify the
change from competition in fact between rivals to coordination under
a license between now-friendly firms until the patentee carries its usual
burden of showing that the licensee's conduct actually meets every limitation of at least one claim in the patent. The patentee's usual burden in
this regard does not vanish merely because it walks through the door
of an antitrust enforcement agency. To the contrary, a patentee and
licensee should be able and eager to demonstrate to antitrust authorities,
to the same level of detail they employ in routine patent infringement
litigation, 26 that the licensee's conduct falls within the scope of at least
one patent claim owned by the licensor.
25 1 know from personal experience that this is a popular argument among lawyers who
appear before the enforcement agencies. Many readers of this Journal no doubt have
similar experience.
2
6 Trial courts use well-established procedures to focus patent litigation parties on the
precise scope and applicability of the asserted patent claims. For example, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, local rules expressly require a
patentee to provide to the accused infringer, not later than 10 days after the Initial
Case Management Conference, the following: "A chart identifying specifically where each
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License proponents who bark insistently about the presumption of
validity, in addition to ignoring the question of infringement, demonstrate a home truth familiar to experienced patent litigators-namely,
the presumption of validity is invoked somewhat more often than it is
understood. The presumption of validity is neither a by-product of Patent
Office infallibility nor an impregnable substantive shield against serious
validity challenges. It is, instead, simply "a procedural device." 27 In a
patent infringement trial on the merits, the accused infringer that would
invalidate a patent must come forward with supporting evidence, and it
(rather than the patentee) bears the risk of non-persuasion to a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard. In a preliminary injunction proceeding, by stark contrast, the presumption of validity effectively plays no
role at all.
When a patentee moves for a preliminary injunction in a routine
patent infringement suit, it bears the burden of clearing the same fourpart hurdle that faces essentially all preliminary injunction plaintiffs.
Specifically, the patentee's request for a preliminary injunction will be
denied unless it can show "(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance
of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction's favorable impact
on the public interest."28 Importantly, the patentee's burden to show a
likelihood of success on the merits extends both to questions of infringement and validity. The patent thus is not presumed valid but must be
shown to be so.
For example, in the recent case overturning a preliminary injunction
that had been granted to Amazon in its patent case against Barnes &
Noble concerning "one click" ordering on the Web, the Federal Circuit
explained that
Amazon must show that, in light of the presumptions and burdens that
will inhere at trial on the merits, (1) Amazon will likely prove that BN
element of each asserted [patent] claim is found within each Accused Instrumentality .....
N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 3-1 (c). This local rule calling for claim charts is important because
the Northern District of California ranked second among all U.S. district courts in the
number of patent cases it resolved in the 1995-1999 period. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rav. 889,
903-04 (2001) (presenting results of comprehensive empirical study of district court
patent litigation). In my view, the antitrust enforcement agencies should consider using
a similar approach to obtain detailed claim charts from the parties to a patent license.
2 Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (vacating preliminary
injunction in patentee's favor).
28 Amazon.com, Inc. v. barnesandnoble.com, inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(reversing grant of preliminary injunction in Amazon's favor in a suit on its "one-click"
patent).
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infringes the '411 patent, and (2) Amazon's infringement claim will
likely withstand BN's challenges to the validity and enforceability of
the '411 patent. If BN raises a substantial question concerning either
infringement or validity, i.e., asserts an infringement or invalidity
defense that the patentee cannot prove 29"lacks substantial merit," the
preliminary injunction should not issue.
Nor is the Amazon case unusual in this respect 0 In short, the patentee
cannot peremptorily eliminate a competitor's marketplace independence with a preliminary injunction unless it1 "present[s] a clear case
supporting the validity of the patent in suit."'

The consequences for the proponents of a dubious patent license
agreement in an antitrust investigation are straightforward. Just as the
patentee that wants a preliminary injunction must present a clear,
detailed case supporting the validity and the infringement of the patent
when substantial questions are raised on these points, so too must the
proponents of what is functionally a preliminary injunction in the patentee's favor-the license agreement-present a clear, detailed case supporting the validity and the infringement of the patent when an antitrust
enforcement agency raises a substantial reason to doubt either proposition. Professor Shapiro is thus quite correct to observe, in his recent
analysis of the appropriate antitrust limits to impose on patent license
agreements, that "the patent holder is not 'entitled' to negotiate a
monopoly outcome,just because the patent holder asserts that its patent
32
is valid and infringed by a particular rival.
at 1350-51 (citations omitted).
10See Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming
grant of preliminary injunction for patentee) ("In the context of a preliminary injunction,
while 'the burden of proving invalidity is with the party attacking validity,' the party seeking
the injunction 'retain[s] the burden of showing a reasonable likelihood that the attack
on its patent's validity would fail."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Purdue
Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction for patentee) ("[T] o support its preliminary injunction,
[patentee] Purdue bore the burden of establishing a likelihood of success on these issues
and thus must have shown that [accused infringer] Roxane likely will not prove that the
patent is invalid."); Nutrition 21, 930 F.2d at 869 ("[A]t the preliminary injunction stage,
because of the extraordinary nature of the relief, the patentee carries the burden of showing
likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the patent's validity, enforceability, and
infringement."); New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of patentee's preliminary injunction motion) ("[T]he
presumption [of validity] does not relieve a patentee who moves for a preliminary injunction from carrying the normal burden of demonstrating that it will likely succeed on all
disputed liability issues at trial, even when the issue concerns the patent's validity.").
11Amazon.corn, 239 F.3d at 1359.
32Shapiro, supra note 12, at 10.
29 Id.
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B.

WHEN PROTECTING PATENT COUNSEL'S OPINION

WARRANTS AN ADVERSE INFERENCE
My second suggested principle is that an antitrust agency should be
no worse off when assessing the erstwhile competitor's good faith basis
for sacrificing its independence to the patentee than it would be ifit
were challenging a merger defended on failing firm grounds. What does
this mean in practice?
The theory that animates the failing firm defense, articulated in the
first Supreme Court case that recognized it, is that it "does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the intention of
the Clayton Act" to permit a merger when confronted with "the case of
a corporation in failing circumstances, the recovery of which to a normal
condition was, to say the least, in gravest doubt, selling its capital to the
only available purchaser in order to avoid what its officers fairly concluded was a more disastrous fate."33
If the proponents of a challenged merger wish to rely on a failing
firm theory, they must plead and prove it as an affirmative defense. In
other words, the burden is entirely on the merger proponents to prove
the requisite elements of the defense.34 As a general matter, then, it seems
plain that the proponents of a challenged patent license agreement, to
the extent that they wish to rely on the merits of the patentee's underlying
claim to have been able to use its patent to foreclose the licensee's
independent marketplace conduct, should bear the burden of establishing their underlying claim as an affirmative defense to any antitrust
challenge to the license agreement (as well as the risk of failing to do
so). And this burden allocation does not exhaust the value of the failing
firm construct to antitrust enforcement in the patent license context.
More specifically, the requisite elements of the failing firm defense
are that "the company to be acquired is in imminent danger of failure,"
the failing firm has "no realistic prospect for a successful reorganization,"
and "there is no viable alternative purchaser that poses less anticompetitive risk." 5 The third element, moreover, has been operationalized in
33Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 301, 302-03 (1930). See also Dr Pepper/SevenUp Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (remanding for further consideration
of failing firm theory) ("[T]he purpose of the Clayton Act is not served by prohibiting
companies from purchasing failing competitors when there are no other alternatives.").
34See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974); Olin Corp. v.
FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1993); Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos., 991 F.2d at 864-65.
111 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 339. See also Merger Guidelines, supra note 16,
§ 5.1 (setting forth essentially the same elements).
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a quite practical and-for purposes of scrutinizing patent license
arrangements-suggestive way. Rejecting an absolutist approach, which
would saddle the merger proponents with the difficult (if not impossible)
task of proving the lack of any viable alternative purchaser anywhere,
the courts have merely required proof of a good faith (albeit unsuccessful) effort on the near-failing target's part to locate an alternative buyer,
36
a merger that would pose a lesser threat to competition.
How does the failing firm defense advance the antitrust analysis of a
patent license agreement? Map the failing firm scenario onto the dubious
patent license proponents, treating the patentee as the acquiring firm
and the licensee as the target firm. The analog for proof of a good faith
effort on the target's part to locate an alternative buyer is proof of a
good faith basis for the licensee's belief that it was certainly infringing
a valid patent and thus had no viable alternative to sacrificing its independence to the patentee. The licensee's beliefs on this score are, of course,
almost certain to have been shaped in substantial part by the legal advice
that its patent counsel has rendered about the scope and validity of the
licensed patent and the nature of the licensee's conduct. As a result,
requiring the licensee to offer proof justifying a good faith belief that
it had no alternative but to enter the license effectively forces the licensee
to choose between asserting or waiving its evidentiary privilege in the
substance of legal advice from its patent counsel. This choice, however
unpleasant for the licensee, will not be unfamiliar.
To a patent lawyer, proof of the sort called for here sounds a great
deal like the inverse of the proof typically relied upon to rebut an
allegation that one's patent infringement was willful, i.e., undertaken
without due care for the known patent rights of another. When infringement is alleged to be willful, the accused infringer can defeat the charge
with a competent (usually written) legal opinion from its patent counsel
that provides a good faith basis for believing that the patent at issue "was
not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable and would be so held if
litigated. ' 37 Rebutting a willfulness charge thus also typically puts a party
- See General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 507 ("A company invoking the [failing firm]
defense has the burden of showing... that it tried and failed to merge with a company
other than the acquiring one." (footnote omitted)); Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos., 991 F.2d at
865 ("[T]he proponent of the acquisition must demonstrate that it has made a reasonable,
good faith attempt to locate an alternative buyer."). See also Merger Guidelines, supranote
16, § 5.1 ("[T]he allegedly failing firm ... has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to
elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that would
both keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe
danger to competition than does the proposed merger." (footnote omitted)).
37 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 14.2, at 807 (5th ed. 2001).

Genuine reliance on a competent opinion letter from patent counsel effectively neutralizes
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to the choice of asserting or waiving its evidentiary privilege in the
substance of legal advice from its patent counsel.
Not surprisingly, the patent law's standard procedural response to an
accused infringer's refusal to proffer the substance of its patent counsel's
opinion is quite instructive here. The court hearing a patent infringement case cannot force the accused infringer to waive its privilege in a
noninfringement/invalidity opinion from its patent counsel. Nor, however, should the court assume that the opinion provided a good faith
basis for the infringer's continuing infringement.38 Indeed, quite the
opposite is true. As the Federal Circuit has explained,
Where the infringer fails to introduce an exculpatory opinion of counsel
at trial, a court must be free to infer that either no opinion was obtained
or, if an opinion were obtained, it was contrary to the infringer's
desire
39
to initiate or continue its use of the patentee's invention.
The refusal to share the opinion justifies an adverse inference about
its substance.
A similar adverse inference seems equally appropriate in the context
of antitrust agency review of a dubious patent license agreement. If the
proponents of the patent license agreement wish to rely on the merits
of the patentee's underlying claim to have been able to use its patent to
foreclose the licensee's independent marketplace conduct, the licensee
should be able and eager to offer proof sufficient tojustify its purported
good faith belief that it was certainly infringing a valid patent and thus
had no viable alternative but to sacrifice its independence to the patentee.
A competent opinion letter from patent counsel would constitute such
proof. When a licensee in this situation fails to provide an opinion from
patent counsel detailing the licensee's infringement of a valid patent, the
a willfulness allegation because, by definition, "[w] illfulness is shown when, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, clear and convincing evidence establishes that
the infringer acted in disregard of the patent, that the infringer had no reasonable basis
for believing it had a right to engage in the infringing acts." Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v.
Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
s8See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(reversing district court's finding that infringement was not willful) ("Although a party
to litigation may indeed withhold disclosure of the advice given by its counsel, as a
privileged communication, it will not be presumed that such withheld advice was favorable
to the party's position.").
39Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See also L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1126 ("We have held that the assertion of privilege with
respect to infringement and validity opinions of counsel may support the drawing of
adverse inferences."); HARMON, supranote 37, at 814 ("An accused infringer has the right
to assert the attorney-client privilege. And when it refuses to produce an exculpatory
opinion of counsel in response to a charge of willful infringement, an inference may be
drawn that either no opinion was obtained or, if one was obtained, it was unfavorable.").
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antitrust enforcement agency-and any tribunal hearing a subsequent
antitrust challenge to the agreement-must be free to infer from this
failure either that no such opinion was obtained or, if an opinion was
obtained, that it did not justify the licensee's conclusion that it had no
viable alternative but to sacrifice its independence to the patentee.
III. WHY ANTITRUST AGENCIES SHOULD FORMULATE
PATENT LAW REFORMS
The bad news is that the substantive scope and validity of the patent(s)
underlying a license are central to determining the lawfulness of the
license's effects on competition. The good news is that this bad news
does not make antitrust scrutiny of patent licenses fruitless. At the very
least, patent law's procedural rules may offer some benefits to the antitrust enforcement agencies as they scrutinize troubling patent licenses.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion of some benefits that patent
law's procedural rules may offer, one could in fairness complain that I
am re-arranging some deck chairs on a badly listing ship. Can we right
ourselves more solidly in the waves of more and more patents from
increasingly varied technological domains? Not, I think, until the antitrust enforcement agencies take a far more active role in shaping patent
law in the United States.
Joel Klein, during his tenure as the Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, described the basic danger that may lurk at the heart
of any patent license agreement-namely, that the patentee and its
erstwhile challenger have cut a deal to delay rightful competition, aligning their anticompetitive interests against the public's interests. This
danger results from the basic legal rule, with us since the Supreme
Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,that a patent held invalid as to one is invalid as to all. 40 As
Professor John Thomas has explained, under Blonder-Tongue Laboratories
"[p]atents are declared invalid for all purposes, not vis-a-vis a particular
individual. A prevailing opponent of a patent therefore cannot prevent
others," including other competitors of the patentee and itself, "from
practicing the invention claimed in the invalidated patent." 41 One drawback of this regime, from an antitrust perspective, is "that a potential
[patent] opponent cannot appropriate the benefits of a successful charge
-°402U.S. 313 (1971).
John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 333.
41
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of patent invalidity to itself," as a result of which there are "fewer patent
'4 2
challenges than are socially optimal.
Another drawback of the Blonder-Tongue Laboratoriesregime is that the
putative attacker's potential inability to recoup the costs of its assault
on a patent makes a license from the patentee that fences out mutual
competitors far more attractive. As Joel Klein put it, "our principal concern is whether the patents or their owners are using the [license]
arrangement to blunt competition that would otherwise take place-a
rather-switch-than-fightstrategy, if you will." 4 3 In other words, "settlements
are often based on considerations that lead parties to give up rights that
they might well vindicate if they went to the mat. And when intellectual
property rights are at stake, the consequences of those compromises can
align the settlers' interests against the interests of consumers." 44 In the
face of this danger, which all patents on commercially significant technologies potentially present, the antitrust enforcement agencies can best
promote both static and dynamic efficiency not merely by challenging
individual anticompetitive license agreements, but also by identifying
and supporting reforms to patent law that reduce every patentee's ability
to use the promise of a cut of monopoly rents to tame a fierce rival into
a placid licensee.
The antitrust agencies need not, and should not, start the process of
formulating reforms from scratch. Indeed, as the copiousJoint Hearings
testimony and varied writings of current patent law professors amply
demonstrate, a number of concrete and valuable reform proposals have
already been made. To mention but a few that seem especially appealing
from an antitrust perspective:

42 Id.

at 334.

43Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, Address Before the American Intellec-

tual Property Law Association 4 (May 2, 1997) (emphasis added), http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/speeches/1 123.htm.
"Id. Others have made the same observation. See, e.g., Robert J. Hoerner, Antitrust
Pitfalls in Patent Litigation Settlement Agreements, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 113, 114 (1998) ("When
an alleged infringer decides that it is in his interest to settle a patent infringement litigation
against him, his entire business outlook changes. Where before he wanted the patent held
invalid, he now may want the patent held valid so that the patent owner can assert it
against his competitors. Where before he wanted the patent given a narrow scope, he
now may want the patent to be given a broad scope so that it can reach the products of
his competitors. .. . And, he will want to do what he can to commit the patent owner to
suing, and not licensing, his competition if they are arguably infringing."); Shapiro, supra
note 12, at 7 ("Settlements can deprive consumers not only of competition between the
settling parties, but from other firms as well if an invalid patent is never actually challenged.").
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statutory presumption of validity should be substantially weakened, if not eliminated outright;45

" the

" the fee-shifting rules should be changed to provide that a plaintiff
patentee must pay the attorney fees of a successful accused infringer
that prevails on grounds that demonstrate that the infringement
46
claim should never have been brought in the first place;
* a bounty system could be created at the patent application stage,
encouraging parties that know about prior art that would defeat a
pending patent application to submit that prior art to the Patent
Office.

47

The presumption of validity should be changed because, even when
correctly used as a merely procedural device, it rests on the painfully
naive (or willfully blind) assumption of ideally exhaustive Patent Office
review for patentability. Consequently, the presumption too vigorously
guards against erroneous invalidation of theoretically valid, but realistically under-examined, patents. There is also merit in adopting a feeshifting rule to cover the reasonable attorney fees of a defendant who
demonstrates that the patentee should have avoided imposing an invalid
patent on the public. Such a fee-shifting mechanism would encourage
an accused infringer with a meritorious case to stay in the fight longer
(i.e., it would help the accused infringer to better resist the patentee's
efforts to realign the infringer's interests with its own), as well as force
45 See Toward a Better Informed Patent System: FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition
and Intellectual Property Law in the Knowledge-Based Economy 6 (Apr. 10, 2002) (presentation of Jay P. Kesan, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law) [hereinafter Kesan, Better Informed]
("Eliminate [the] presumption of validity-[it] gives away a valuable residual right and
currently [we] get very little in return."), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020410jaypkesan.pdf; Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 763, 769 (2002) [hereinafter Kasen, Carrotsand Sticks] (proposing, inter alia, that "we
eliminate the presumption of validity for any patent that issues under the current [prior
art] disclosure rules"); Lemley, supranote 1, at 1528-29 ("At a bare minimum, the presumption of validity should be pared back so that it covers only prior art references and
arguments actually considered by the examiner.").
416See Kesan, Better Informed, supra note 45, at 9 ("One-way, pro-defendant fee shifting if
patents revoked or invalidated based on prior art categories that could have been reasonably
discovered by the patentee."); Kesan, Carrotsand Sticks, supranote 45, at 795-97 (proposing
fee-shifting rule in detail); Lemley, supranote 1, at 1530-31 (" [A] ccused infringers normally
won't get attorney's fees unless they can prove that the suit was filed in bad faith. It may
make sense to add some balance to the fee awards [on analogy to copyright law] ...
and therefore help shift some of the burden of determining validity away from accused
infringers."); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital,4J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 146 (2000) (suggesting "a partial fee-shifting idea: grant fees
to patent defendants who prevail in circumstances that show that the case should never
have been filed").
17 See Thomas, supra note 41, at 342-50 (describing in detail a proposed applicationstage bounty system).
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patent applicants further to internalize the full cost of vetting their
innovations for genuine patentability.4"
The foregoing proposals merit serious consideration by the antitrust
enforcement agencies. At the same time, I am skeptical that either a feeshifting rule to benefit successful accused infringers or a bounty system
at the patent applicationstage goes far enough in driving a wedge between
patentees and the rivals that they seek to oust or tame. An attorney fee
award, although it encourages an accused infringer with a meritorious
case to stay in the fight, is not enough to overcome the collective action
problem confronting patent challengers under current law. Indeed, it
is not enough even to make the accused infringer whole, for the simple
reason that attorney fee awards do nothing to compensate a firm for
the lost productivity of employees who were diverted from the firm's
forward-looking work by the backward-looking distraction of litigation.
Professor Thomas's application-stage bounty proposal does attempt,
quite rightly, to overcome the collective action problem that deadens
an infringer's incentive to challenge an invalid patent-the very same
collective action problem that is the linchpin of a patentee's plan to coopt its rival with a cut of the monopoly rent. 49 At the same time, by
operating at the pre-issuance application stage, rather than the postissuance litigation stage, the bounty he proposes has an effect diffused
across the full range of patent applications-from plainly meritless applications on inventions of little commercial significance to seemingly ironclad applications on key new technologies. 50 Thus, my own tentative view
is that a bounty mechanism is desirable, but that it should operate at
51
the litigation stage.
A litigation-stage bounty mechanism would both discourage shoddy
prior art searches by patent applicants and encourage peristence on the
part of accused infringers with strong evidence of invalidity. Specifically,
an accused infringer who succeeds in negating a patent claim on grounds
48The other main component driving such internalization is the level set for patent
application filing fees and patent maintenance fees, which are the sole funding source
for Patent Office operations.
49 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
50As Professor Lemley has observed, "if the [Thomas] bounties encourage prior art
submitters to pick 'low-hanging fruit' by submitting art to invalidate obviously worthless
patents, they may increase the cost of the system with little corresponding benefit." Lemley,
supra note 1, at 1526 n.1 12. Rather than simply hope "that the [Thomas] bounties would
elicit prior art submissions primarily about patents that are likely candidates for future
litigation," id. at 1525 n.112, I would structure the bounty mechanism so that it applies
only to the subset of patents that are actually litigated and thus of demonstrated commercial significance.
511 am currently working on a paper that constructs such a litigation-stage bounty
proposal. Joseph Scott Miller, Patent Law: Its Cause and Cure (in progress).
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that show that the patentee could reasonably have avoided prompting
the issuance of an invalid or unenforceable patent in the first place (in
practice, proof of invalidating printed prior art that the patentee would
have found with a diligent prior art search, or did find and should have
disclosed) would receive a bounty equal to a share of the profits the
patentee had earned that were attributable to the invalid patent. 2 The
patentee would be required to disgorge those profits to the accused
infringer as the bounty. This bounty would be available only to the first
accused infringer(s) that obtain a final, unappealable judgment that the
patent is invalid or unenforceable. Other parties that were, or would
have been, accused infringers receive the benefit of unencumbered entry
into the newly opened market, but only the successful patent attacker
receives the bounty bonus.
My proposal, which would apply to all issued patents, is akin to the
six-month semi-exclusivity bounty for drug patents, which is provided to
the first ANDA filer under the Hatch-Waxman regime for promoting
entry by generic drug makers.5 According to Alfred Engelberg, who
served as the Generic Pharmaceutical Association's patent counsel during
the formulation and passage of the Hatch-Waxman regime in 1984, the
semi-exclusivity "provision was requested by the generic drug manufacturers to insure that the successful challenger of a patent would have
an opportunity to recoup its litigation costs before other generic manufacturers could take advantage of the elimination of the patent as a
barrier to competition." 54 In other words, the Hatch-Waxman rules recognize and attempt to address precisely the collective action problem
55
described by Professor Thomas, but with a litigation-stage bounty.
The Hatch-Waxman regime is admittedly an unpopular one at the
moment, especially among antitrust lawyers. But its semi-exclusivity rule
has been an excellent laboratory for patent law reform more generally,
both for the good and the bad that it shows. Hatch-Waxman has led to
52

Just how large a share of the patentee's profits should be disgorged is unclear to me
at present. For the sake of simplicity, one might opt to force disgorgement of 100%.
Other candidate formulations may emerge.
53 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5)(B) (iv) (providing first ANDA filer with 6 months of semiexclusivity); see also Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisionsfor Pharmaceuticals:Have
They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 403-04 (1999) (describing the first ANDA
filer's semi-exclusivity as both "a 'bounty' provision" and "a significant incentive to challenge patents").
54Engelberg, supra note 53, at 403-04; see also id. at 423 ("The entire purpose of the
180-day exclusivity provision, at the time it was drafted, was to insure that one generic
competitor would not get a free ride on the litigation effort of another generic competitor
until the party who had borne the cost and risk of litigation had a fair opportunity to
recover its litigation costs.").
55See Thomas, supra ihote 41, at 333-34.
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a great deal of abuse by allowing some generic drug makers to trap other
generic drug makers behind an insuperable entry barrier, induced to
do so by large cash payments from the threatened brand-name drug
maker. 56 But it has also demonstrated the boon to competition from
providing market participants with a benefit for taking down invalid
patents that they can appropriate to themselves, thus correcting the
under-supply of patent challenges. Importantly, the Federal Trade Commission's recently completed, comprehensive study of the harm to competition posed by some features of Hatch-Waxman concludes that "the
data suggest that, in and of itself, the 180-day exclusivity provision generally has not created a bottleneck to prevent FDA approval of subsequent
eligible generic applicants."5 7 There is thus reason to hope that, if the
errant features of the statute can be altered, thus depriving brand-name
drug makers of the opportunity to game the system by using one generic's
semi-exclusivity to block entry by others, the 180-day bounty can play
its intended role in encouraging someone to be the first successful
patent challenger.
IV. CONCLUSION
To grapple effectively with the competitive effects of a patent license
agreement under ambiguous conditions, antitrust authorities must, in
the end, address questions of patent law. Patent law dictates what a given
patentee can, and cannot, exclude another from doing. Patent law thus
plays a central role in defining the competitive relationship among patentee and licensee firms. The joint IP Guidelines, in hewing to this path,
did not break new ground so much as they followed common sense.
Patent law, of course, contains both procedural and substantive rules.
As a result, antitrust authorities can and should take full account of
patent law's procedural doctrines when investigating the competitive
effects of patent licenses. These procedural doctrines, when deployed
in the antitrust enforcement context, can draw out key information from
the patent license parties and thus aid and focus an agency's investigation.
The two principles derived here-(a) that a patentee should be no better
off when defending the presumptive scope of its licensed patent rights
to an antitrust agency than it would be if it were attempting to obtain
a preliminary injunction against a competitor, and (b) that an antitrust
agency should be no worse off when assessing the erstwhile competitor's
56 See Engelberg, supra note 53, at 416-17, 423-25 (describing numerous problems
caused by the structure of the semi-exclusivity provision).
57

FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN

FTC STUDY viii (2002).
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good-faith basis for sacrificing its independence to the patentee than it
would be if it were challenging a merger that the parties defend on
failing firm grounds-illustrate the power of taking account of such
procedural doctrines. No doubt there are other patent law procedural
rules that can further sharpen one's antitrust analysis of particular
patent licenses.
Antitrust policy makers should do more, however, than take full
account of patent law rules, both substantive and procedural. They
should also fully join the debates about just what shape those patent law
rules should take. One area in which antitrust insights may be especially
fruitful is the cluster of patent law doctrines that structure the market
for challenges to the validity of patents on commercially significant
technologies-chief among them the rule of Blonder-TongueLaboratories,58
according to which all market players share the benefit of one firm's
successful challenge to a patent's validity. Current law makes it too easy
for a patentee to co-opt a rival, depriving the public of the benefits of
competition that would ensue were an invalid patent exposed and market
entry facilitated. A new litigation-stage bounty for the first successful
patent challenger could help correct a framework that appears designed
to undersupply definitive patent challenges.
My litigation-centered, profits-disgorgement bounty proposal may at
first appear a bit harsh. As I have said, my own view on the matter is still
developing. But my final goal in this essay has not been to demonstrate
that a specific reform proposal is right in all its particulars and fully
worthy of the antitrust enforcement agencies' support. Rather, it has
been to show that, notwithstanding the boost they may draw from patent
law's procedural rules, the antitrust enforcement agencies cannot fully
discharge their mission to foster competition without pressing for
changes to U.S. patent law that aim to break the power patentees now
have to co-opt their rivals, cutting short the validity and noninfringement
challenges that threaten to knock down wrongful entry barriers.

58 402 U.S. 313 (1971).

